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Abstract This paper examines the relative risk of subprime mortgages
and community reinvestment loans originated through the
Community Advantage Program (CAP). A sample of comparable
borrowers with similar risk characteristics is constructed using
the propensity score matching method but holding two different
loan products. The ﬁndings reveal that the sample of community
reinvestment loans has a lower default risk than subprime loans,
very likely because they are not originated by brokers and lack
risky features such as adjustable rates and prepayment penalties.
Results suggest that similar borrowers holding more sustainable
products exhibit signiﬁcantly lower default risks.
One major concern after the collapse of the subprime mortgage market is whether
the efforts to extend credit to lower-income and minority homebuyers will fall out
of favor. Different from the high-risk subprime lending, there are some special
lending programs targeting low-income and minority population with safe and
sound operation in the residential mortgage market, such as Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA)-motivated lending. The CRA directs depository
institutions to help meet the credit needs of all segments of their local
communities. Studies have shown that CRA has increased the volume of lending
to low- and moderate-income households (Apgar and Duda, 2003; Avery,
Courchane, and Zorn, 2009), while most subprime loans were originated by
lenders not covered by CRA (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, 2007a).
What is missing in the debate on the subprime crisis is an empirical examination
of the relative performance of similar borrowers holding either a typical CRA-
related loan or a subprime product. Such an analysis will help inform policy by
answering the question of whether CRA-type mortgages contributed signiﬁcantly
to the housing crisis. Since borrowers holding CRA-type mortgages generally had
higher levels of credit risk, such study also helps to answer the question of whether
the high default rates of subprime loans represent just the higher risk proﬁle of
borrowers holding these loans or the risky characteristics of subprime loans. Some246  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
products or features that are more prevalent among subprime loans, such as
prepayment penalties, adjustable rates, and balloon payments, have been found to
be associated with elevated default risk (e.g., Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar,
2005; Quercia, Stegman, and Davis, 2007; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010). Are
the higher default rates reported in the subprime sector mainly the result of risky
loan products?
This study compares the performance of subprime loans and CRA loans in a
special lending program called the Community Advantage Program (CAP). Since
performance differences may be due to differences in credit risk of borrowers who
receive different product type, propensity score matching methods is used to
construct a sample of comparable borrowers. The ﬁndings reveal that for
borrowers with similar risk characteristics, the default risk will be about 70%
lower with a CAP loan than with a subprime mortgage. Broker-origination
channel, adjustable rates, and prepayment penalties all contribute substantially to
the elevated risk of default among subprime loans. When broker origination is
combined with both adjustable rates and prepayment penalties, the borrower’s
default risk is four to ﬁve times higher than that of a comparable borrower
with a prime-term CRA mortgage. Though CAP has some program-speciﬁc
characteristics, the results of this study clearly suggest that mortgage default risk
cannot be attributed solely to borrower credit risk; the high default risk is
signiﬁcantly associated with the characteristics of loan products. Done responsibly,
targeted lending programs stimulated by the CRA can do a much better job of
providing sustainable homeownership for the low- to moderate-income (LMI)
population than subprime lending. The results have important policy implications
for how to respond to the current housing crisis and how to meet the credit needs
of all communities, especially those with large fraction of LMI borrowers, in the
long run.
Compared to prior work, this study is characterized by several important
differences. First, while most early studies focused on the performance of
mortgages within different markets, the focus here is on similar LMI borrowers
with different mortgages, and the relative risk of the different mortgage products.
Second, because of data constraints, research on the performance of CRA loans
is scarce. With a unique dataset, this study examines the long-term viability of
the homeownership opportunities that CRA-type products provide, relative to that
of subprime alternatives. Finally, there have been few discussions and applications
of the propensity score matching method in real estate research. This study uses
propensity score models to explicitly address the selection bias issue and
constructs a comparison group based on observational data. This method allows
isolation of the impact of loan product features via the origination channel on the
performance of mortgages.
The recent studies on the risk of subprime mortgages and CRA lending are
reviewed next. The discussion then continues to the data and method used to
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loans with similar borrower characteristics. A discussion of regression results
follows. The paper closes with concluding remarks including the possible policy
implications.
 Literature Review
Risk of Subprime Mortgages
Subprime mortgages were originally designed as reﬁnancing tools to help
borrowers with impaired credit consolidate debt. With the reformed lending laws,
the adoption of automated underwriting, risk-based pricing, as well as the
persistent growth in house prices nationwide, the subprime lending channel soon
expanded its credit to borrowers on other margins. The subprime surge was rapid
and wide: between 1994 and 2006, the subprime share of all mortgage originations
more than quadrupled, from 4.5% to 20.1%; subprime loan originations increased
more than seventeen fold, from $35 billion to about $600 billion.
Beginning in late 2006, a rapid rise in subprime mortgage delinquency and
foreclosure caused a so-called meltdown of the subprime market. The Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA) reports that the serious delinquency rate for subprime
loans in the second quarter of 2008 was 7.6 times higher than that for prime loans
(17.9% vs. 2.35%). Although subprime mortgages represented about 12% of the
outstanding loans, they represented 48% of the foreclosures started during the
same quarter (MBA, 2008). Delinquency and default rates for subprime loans
typically are six times to more than ten times higher than those of prime mortgages
(Pennington-Cross, 2003; Immergluck, 2008).
A rapid rise in high-risk subprime mortgage delinquency and foreclosure suggests
there are limits to such efforts. The high default rate of subprime loans reﬂects
the higher level of risk characteristics of borrowers holding high-risk subprime
mortgages than average prime borrowers. Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007)
suggest that house price decline was the primary driver of the high default rate
of subprime loans in Massachusetts. Mian and Suﬁ (2009) conclude that the recent
foreclosure mess is primarily driven by house price declines, but their results also
suggest that loose underwriting in places with high latent demand is an important
determinant in the price bubble in the ﬁrst half of this decade and subsequent
foreclosures. They suggest that the loose underwriting intended to expand the
supply to borrowers, who were traditionally unable to access the mortgage market,
led to a rapid increase in the risk proﬁle of borrowers, a surge in supply-induced
house price, and the subsequent spike in default rates. Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(forthcoming) have shown the quality of subprime loans deteriorated for six
consecutive years before the crisis. Both Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) and
Mian and Suﬁ (2009) reach a similar conclusion: the unsustainable growth of the
subprime mortgage market leads to the collapse of the market, which follows a
classic lending boom-bust scenario.248  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
However, it is important to make a distinction between borrowers and mortgage
products. It can be said that there are two types of borrowers and two types of
mortgage products: prime and subprime. Not all prime borrowers get prime
mortgages and not all subprime borrowers get subprime mortgages. Borrowers
who do not meet all the traditional underwriting guidelines can be considered
subprime but these borrowers can receive prime-type mortgages as they may
through CRA efforts. Similarly, borrowers with good credit can receive subprime
products characterized by high debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios, no or low
documentation, teaser and adjustable rates, and other such risky characteristics
(the so called Alt-A market).
In the literature, some loan features and loan terms are more prevalent in the
subprime sector than in other markets and are also associated with higher default
risk. As summarized by Cutts and Van Order (2005) and Immergluck (2008),
characteristics of subprime loans relative to prime loans include: (1) high interest
rates, points, and fees, (2) prevalence of prepayment penalties, (3) prevalence of
balloon payments, (4) prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), and (5)
popularity of broker originations. After 2004, some ‘‘innovative’’ mortgage
products, such as interest-only, payment option, negative amortization, hybrid
ARMs, and piggy-back loans became more popular in the subprime sector
(Immergluck, 2008). Quercia, Stegman, Davis, and Stein (2007) ﬁnd that subprime
ARMs have a higher risk of foreclosure because of the interest-rate risk. At the
aggregate level, the share of ARMs appears to be positively associated with market
risk as measured by the probability of the property value to decline in the next
two years (Immergluck, 2008). Subprime hybrid ARMs, which usually have
prepayment penalties, bear a particularly high risk of default at the time the
interest rate is reset (Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar, 2005; Pennington-Cross
and Ho, 2010).
As to the feature of prepayment penalties and balloons, Quercia, Stegman, Davis,
and Stein (2007) ﬁnd that reﬁnanced loans with prepayment penalties are 20%
more likely to experience a foreclosure than loans without while loans with
balloon payments are about 50% more likely to experience a foreclosure than
those without. Prepayment penalties also tend to reduce prepayments and increase
the likelihood of delinquency and default among subprime loans (Danis and
Pennington-Cross, 2005).
Mortgage brokers have played a greater role in the subprime sector during the
subprime boom (Woodward, 2008; LaCour-Little, 2009). Empirical evidence on
the behavior of broker-originated mortgages is scarce. LaCour-Little and Chun
(1999) ﬁnd that for the four types of mortgages analyzed, loans originated by a
third party (including broker and correspondence) were more likely to prepay than
loans originated by a lender. Alexander, Grimshaw, McQueen, and Slade (2002)
ﬁnd that third-party originated loans do not necessarily prepay faster but they
default with greater frequency than similar retail loans. They suggest that third-
party originated mortgages have higher default risk than similar retail loans
because brokers are rewarded for originating a loan but not held accountable for
the loan’s subsequent performance.Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  249
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Thus, the higher default rates reported in subprime lending may be because of
risky borrowers, risky loan products, or a combination of both.
CRA Lending
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 was created in response to
charges that ﬁnancial institutions were engaging in redlining and discrimination.
The Act mandates that federally insured depository institutions help meet the
credit needs of the communities in which they operate in a manner consistent with
safe and sound operation (Avery, Courchane, and Zorn, 2009). Regulators assess
each bank’s CRA record when evaluating these institutions’ applications for
mergers, acquisitions, and branch openings. The performance of large institutions
is measured under three categories of bank activities: lending, services, and
investment, with the lending test carrying the most weight (at least 50%).1 For
the lending test, it examines the amount and proportion of lending activities made
within an institution’s assessment area.2 Usually, loans are regarded as ‘‘CRA-
related’’ if they are made by CRA-regulated institutions within their assessment
areas to low-income borrowers (those with less than 80% area median income
(AMI), regardless of neighborhood income) or in a low- income neighborhood
(with less than 80% AMI, regardless of borrower income) (Avery, Bostic, and
Canner, 2000).
The CRA lending test also examines the use of innovative or ﬂexible lending
practices to address the credit needs of LMI households and community. In
response, many banks have developed ‘‘CRA Special Lending Programs’’ or have
introduced mortgage products characterized by more ﬂexible underwriting
standards. Survey results suggest that most ﬁnancial institutions offer these special
programs, and that most of the programs relate to home mortgage lending, which
typically feature some combination of special outreach, counseling and education,
and underwriting ﬂexibility (especially in terms of reduced cash to close,
alternative credit veriﬁcation, and higher debt-to-income thresholds) (Avery,
Bostic, and Canner, 2000). Apgar and Duda (2003) and Avery, Courchane, and
Zorn (2009) suggest the CRA has had a positive impact on underserved
populations by enabling the origination of a higher proportion of loans to low-
income borrowers and communities than they would have without CRA.
CRA-type mortgages are different from subprime loans in that CRA products
usually have prime-term characteristics. In general, they are believed to carry a
higher risk because they are originated by liberalizing one or two underwriting
criteria. A few studies investigating the delinquency behaviors among CRA
borrowers suggest the delinquency rate of CRA mortgages is comparable to that
of FHA loans after excluding loans with low loan-to-value ratios (LTV) (e.g.,
Quercia, Stegman, Davis, and Stein, 2002). Laderman and Reid (2009) ﬁnd loans
originated by CRA-regulated lenders are signiﬁcantly less likely to be in
foreclosure than those originated (most are subprime loans) by independent
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originated by a CRA lender within its assessment area is an even more important
predictor of foreclosure: loans made by CRA lenders within their assessment areas
are about 50% as likely to go into foreclosure as those made by independent
mortgage companies. But their study focused on California only and not all the
mortgages originated by CRA lenders were originated for the CRA purpose.
Because of data constraints, little is known about the long-term viability of the
homeownership opportunities that the CRA-related products provide.
Why Different Markets Coexist
To increase the ﬂow of funds into low-income populations and neighborhoods,
the CRA encourages lenders to meet credit needs within their service or catchment
area, taking into account safety and soundness considerations. Liberalizing one or
two traditional mortgage underwriting standards allows lenders to make loans to
those who would otherwise not qualify for a prime mortgage (for instance, not
requiring mortgage insurance when the downpayment is less than 20% makes
loans more affordable for some borrowers). In this sense, both CRA and subprime
products may target many of the same borrowers. In fact, recent studies suggest
there is a signiﬁcant overlap between borrowers holding subprime mortgages and
those holding prime loans, FHA loans, and other loan products, particularly among
LMI borrowers with marginal credit quality (e.g., Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2007).
Why would many people who could qualify for low-cost prime-type loans take
out subprime products? First, many borrowers, especially those with an impaired
credit history, are usually ﬁnancially unsophisticated and may feel they have
limited options. Courchane, Surette, and Zorn (2004, p. 365) indicate that
subprime borrowers ‘‘are less knowledgeable about the mortgage process, are less
likely to search for the best rates, and are less likely to be offered a choice among
alternative mortgage terms and instruments.’’ Especially, for some nontraditional
mortgages, including interest-only mortgages, negative amortization mortgages,
and mortgages with teaser rates, they were apparently not well understood by
many borrowers. When borrowers do not know the best price and are less likely
to search for the best rates, it is likely that they cannot make the right decision
when they shop for mortgage products. In fact, Courchane, Surette, and Zorn
(2004) ﬁnd that search behavior, as well as adverse life events, age, and Hispanic
ethnicity contribute to explaining the choice of a subprime mortgage.
Second, predatory lending or abusive lending practices are concentrated in the
subprime sector, which may explain why some borrowers end up with certain
loans. Unscrupulous lenders, or brokers as their agents, may take advantage of
uninformed borrowers by charging fees and rates not reﬂected of the risk, by not
informing borrowers of lower cost loan alternatives, and by offering products and
services without full disclosure of terms and options. Renuart (2004) highlights
the role of loan steering and abusive push-marketing of subprime lending
practices, in which lenders steer borrowers to subprime products instead of low-
cost prime alternatives. In short, borrowers generally sort to prime/CRA, subprimeRisky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  251
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or other mortgage markets based on their risk proﬁle. However, the lack of
ﬁnancial sophistication for some borrowers, the poor alignment of incentives, and
moral hazard considerations are some of the many reasons borrowers—especially
marginally qualiﬁed borrowers—may receive less desirable mortgage products
than they can be qualiﬁed for.
 Data and Methodology
The data for this study come from one LMI-targeted lending program, the
Community Advantage Program (CAP), developed by Self-Help, a non-proﬁt
community development ﬁnance institution in North Carolina, in partnership with
a group of lenders, Fannie Mae, and the Ford Foundation. Participating lenders
establish their own guidelines. The most common variants from typical
conventional, prime standards are: reduced cash required to close (through lower
down payment and/or lower cash reserve requirements); alternative measures or
lower standards of credit quality; and ﬂexibility in assessing repayment ability
(through higher debt ratios and/or ﬂexible requirements for employment history).3
These guidelines variants could be combined or used to offset each other.4 Nearly
90% of the programs feature exceptions in at least two of these areas, and more
than half feature exceptions in all three. The majority of programs combine
neighborhood and borrower targeting.
Under the LMI-targeting CAP lending program, participating lenders are able to
sell these nonconforming mortgages to Self-Help, which then securitizes and sells
them to Fannie Mae or other investors. Participating lenders originate and service
the loans under contract with Self-Help. It should be emphasized that, while many
of the borrowers are somewhat credit impaired, the program cannot be
characterized as subprime. The vast majority of CAP loans are retail originated
(in contrast to broker originated) and feature terms associated with the prime
market: thirty-year ﬁxed-rate loans amortizing with prime-level interest rates, no
prepayment penalties, no balloons, with escrows for taxes and insurance,
documented income, and standard prime-level fees. As a LMI-targeting program,
CAP has some program-speciﬁc characteristics such as income and geographic
limitations.5
The data on subprime loans come from a proprietary database from Lender
Processing Services, Inc. (LPS, formerly McDash Analytics), which provides loan
information collected from approximately 15 mortgage servicers. LPS’ coverage
in the subprime market by volume increased from 14% in 2004 to over 30% in
2006, based on an estimation using data from Inside Mortgage Finance. There is
no universally accepted deﬁnition of subprime mortgage; the three most
commonly used deﬁnitions are: (1) those categorized as such by the secondary
market, (2) those originated by a subprime lender as identiﬁed by HUD’s annual
list, and (3) those that meet HUD’s deﬁnition of a ‘‘high-cost’’ mortgage (Avery,
Brevoort, and Canner, 2007b; Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2007). This paper
primarily follows the ﬁrst deﬁnition and considers the loans with ‘‘B’’ or ‘‘C’’252  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
Exhibit 1  Construction of Subprime Study Sample
# of Observations
Step 1: Subprime loans meeting the following criteria:h o m e
purchase loans, ﬁrst-lien; single family house, 30-year amortization,
conforming loans with a minimum loan amount of $10,000 only.
544,849
Step 2: Exclude loans with no or limited documentation or
missing information for the following variables: LTV, Fico score,
DTI, documentation
86,697
Step 3: Exclude loans not in ZIP Codes with CAP activities and
loans without complete payment history
42,065
Notes: Based on authors’ calculation from LPS. Subprime loans here include B&C loans and high-
cost ARMs (with a margin greater than 300 basis points).
grade categorized by the secondary market as subprime loans.6 High-cost ARMs
are considered as subprime in this analysis. Less than 20% of loans in the LPS
study sample are included solely because they are considered high-cost, deﬁned
as having a margin greater than 300 basis points (Poole, 2007). In addition, we
appended to the data selected census and aggregated HMDA variables at a ZIP
Code level, including the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (‘‘HHI’’) calculated from
HMDA, racial and educational distribution from census data, and area average
FICO scores calculated from the LPS data.
The sample of 9,221 CAP loans originated from 2003 to 2006. All are ﬁrst-lien,
owner-occupied, ﬁxed-rate conforming home purchase loans with full or
alternative documentation. National in scope, these loans were originated in 41
states, with about two-thirds concentrated in Ohio, North Carolina, Illinois,
Georgia, and Oklahoma. To make sure the subprime loans are roughly comparable
to CAP loans, as Exhibit 1 shows, the analysis is limited to subprime mortgages
also characterized as ﬁrst-lien, single-family, purchase-money, and conforming
loans with full or alternative documentation that originated during the same period.
Loans with missing values for some key underwriting variables (FICO score, LTV,
DTI, and documentation status) and loans without complete payment history were
eliminated. Finally, because the goal is to compare CAP and subprime loans in
the same market, subprime loans in areas without CAP lending activities were
excluded. Overall, the sample consists of 42,065 subprime loans. Exhibit 2
summarizes some important characteristics of both CAP loans and subprime loans
in this analysis. Signiﬁcance tests show that almost all variables across the two
groups differ signiﬁcantly before matching, indicating that the covariate
distributions are different between CAP and subprime loans in the original sample.
Worthy of mention is that a few seasoned loans entered the CAP and LPS datasets
months after origination. But as the shares of seasoned loans that were eitherRisky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  253
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DTI 28%–36% 0.278 0.158












 97% 0.823 0.083
Loan Characteristics
Loan amt* 100.86 148.1
ARMs* — 0.903
Broker* — 0.808
Prepayment penalty* — 0.495
Note Rate* 6.66% 7.87%
Neighborhood/Local Characteristics
HHI index (in 10,000, 2005)* 0.051 0.036
Mean area FICO Score (2005)* 688.6 685.2
Share of minority* 0.293 0.482
Education distribution*
Share of less high school 0.199 0.239
Share of high school 0.318 0.283
Share of some college 0.272 0.292
Share of college and above 0.211 0.186
Geography: top 5 states OH (22.3%) CA (19.2%)
NC (14.6%) TX (11.0%)
IL (12.6%) FL (10.1%)
GA (11.4%) IL (9.1%)








*Bivariate 2 test or t-test signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.254  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
Exhibit 3  90-day Delinquency Rate by Loan Types
Prime FRM
Source: Mortgage Banker Association (2008) and Self-Help.
marginal or similar for CAP and subprime loans was veriﬁed, this does not appear
to cause serious bias for the empirical results.7
Though drawn from similar markets, the CAP borrowers (including all active loans
originated as early as 1990s) are not experiencing the same mortgage woes as
subprime borrowers. As Exhibit 3 shows, 3.21% of the sample of community
lending borrowers were 90-days’delinquent or in foreclosure process in the second
quarter of 2008. This was slightly higher than the 2.35% delinquency rate on
prime loans but well below the 17.8% on subprime loans nationwide. Especially,
over 27% of subprime ARMs were in foreclosure or serious delinquency, which
was almost nine times that of community lending loans.
In summary, the CAP and subprime samples have identical characteristics for the
following important underwriting variables: lien status, amortization period, loan
purpose, occupancy status, and documentation type. They were originated during
the same time period and roughly in the same geographic areas. However, the two
samples differ in other underwriting factors, including DTI, LTV, and FICO score,
and in loan amount and some loan features that are more common only for
subprime loans.Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  255
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Methodology
The PSM method has been widely used to reduce selection biases in recent
program evaluation studies. PSM was ﬁrst developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) as an effort to more rigorously estimate causal effects from observational
data. Basically, PSM accounts for observable heterogeneity by pairing participants
with nonparticipants on the basis of the conditional probability of participation,
given the observable characteristics. The PSM approach has gained increasing
popularity among researchers from a variety of disciplines, including biomedical
research, epidemiology, education, sociology, psychology, and social welfare (see
review in Guo, Barth, and Gibons, 2006).
There are three basic steps involved in implementing PSM. First, a set of
covariates is used to estimate the propensity scores using probit or logit, and the
predicted values are retrieved. Then each participant is paired with a comparable
nonparticipant based on propensity scores. In the last step, regression models or
other methods can be applied to the matched group to compare the outcomes of
participants and nonparticipants.
In this case, because receiving a subprime loan is a choice/assignment process
rather than randomly assigned, the PSM method is used to adjust this selection
bias. In the ﬁrst step, logistic regression models are employed to predict the
propensity (e(xi)) for borrower i (i  1,...,N) to receive a subprime loan (Si  1)
using a set of conditioning variables (xi):
e(x)  pr(S  1X  x). (1) ii i i
In the second step, the nearest-neighbor with caliper method is used to match
CAP borrowers with borrowers holding subprime loans based on the estimated
propensity scores from the ﬁrst step. The method of nearest-neighbor with caliper
is a combination of two approaches: traditional nearest-neighbor matching and
caliper matching.8 This method begins with a random sort of the participants and
nonparticipants. The ﬁrst participant is selected and then the nonparticipant subject
with the closest propensity score within a predetermined common-support region
called caliper () is determined. The approach imposes a tolerance level on the
distance between the propensity score of participant i and that of nonparticipant
j. Formally, assuming c(pi) as the set of the neighbors of i in the comparison
group, the corresponding neighborhood can be stated as follows.
c(p)  {j  p  p }. (2) ii j
If there is no member of the comparison group within the caliper for the treated
unit i, then the participant is left unmatched and dropped from the analysis. Thus,256  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
caliper is a way of imposing a common support restriction. Naturally, there is
uncertainty about the choice of a tolerance level since a wider caliper can increase
the matching rate but it also increases the likelihood of producing inexact
matching. A more restrictive caliper increases the accuracy but may signiﬁcantly
reduce the size of the matched sample.
In the context of observational studies, the PSM methods seek to mimic conditions
similar to an experiment so that the assessment of the impact of the program can
be based on a comparison of outcomes for a group of participants (i.e., those with
Si  1) with those drawn from a comparison group of non-participants (Si  0).
The observational data need to be checked to see if they meet the two primary
assumptions underlying the PSM methods: the conditional independence
assumption9 and the overlap assumption.
The conditional independence assumption states that conditional on observable
characteristics, participation (receiving subprime here) is independent of potential
outcomes and unobservable heterogeneity is assumed to play no role in
participation (Dehejia and Sadek, 2002). In other words, assuming that there are
no unobservable differences between the two groups after conditioning on
observed characteristics, any systematic differences in outcomes between
participants and nonparticipants are due to participation. Of course, it is possible
that lenders have access to more information about the borrower and local market
than the information in the dataset and the unobservable lender information may
inﬂuence the estimation results. The strategy is to use a well-speciﬁed logit
regression to estimate the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage for each
cohort, grounded on a sound understanding of the subprime market. The second
assumption, the overlap assumption, is that there must be individuals in the
comparison group with the same or similar propensity as the participant of interest
in order for the matching to be feasible, In this case, it is highly likely that there
is signiﬁcant overlap between the CRA-type CAP loans and the subprime sample
since both of them focus on households with marginal credit quality and have
identical loan characteristics, such as lien status, loan purpose, occupancy status,
and documentation type. As shown in Exhibit 4, the distribution of credit scores
for the CAP and subprime borrowers, subprime borrowers tend to have lower
FICO scores than CAP borrowers, but there is a signiﬁcant overlap in these
distributions.
In the third step, a multinomial regression model (MNL) is used to further control
factors that may inﬂuence the performance of the new sample after loan
origination, many of which are time-varying. In each month the loan can be in
only one state or outcome (active, default, or prepaid). Since the sum of the
probabilities of each outcome must equal to one, the increase in the probability
of one outcome necessitates a decrease in the probability of at least one competing
outcome. Thus the multinomial logit model is a competing risk model. The
mortgage borrowers have three options each month:
 Default: This study treats the incidence of the ﬁrst 90-day delinquency
as a proxy of default.Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  257
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Source: Lender Processing Services, Inc. (LPS) and Self-Help.
 Prepaid: If a loan was prepaid before it is seriously delinquent, it is
considered a prepayment.
 Active: Active and not default (not seriously delinquent in some models)
The probability of observing a particular loan outcome is given by:
 Z  S ji t ji e
Pr(y  j)  for j  1,2 2 it
 Z  S ki t ki 1  e 
k1
1
Pr(y  j)  for j  0 (3) 2 it
 Z  S ki t ki 1  e 
k1
TN2
ln L  d ln(Pr(y  j))  ijt it
t1 i1 j0
where j  0,1,2 represents the three possible outcomes of a loan and the omitted
category (j  0) remains active and not seriously delinquent (Active); dijt is an
indicator variable taking on the value 1 if outcome j occurs to loan i at time t,258  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
and zero otherwise; Z contains a set of explanatory variables; and  is the
coefﬁcient. To identify the difference between the performance of CAP loans and
subprime loans, S contains a subprime dummy variable or indicators of subprime
loan characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, the impact one origination channel and two loan characteristics is
examined: the prepayment penalty, the adjustable rate, and the broker origination
channel. Six mutually exclusive dummy variables are constructed for the
combinations of these three characteristics,10 such as sub bro&arm&ppp for
‘‘broker-originated subprime loans with adjustable rates and prepayment
penalties’’ and sub arm for ‘‘retail-originated subprime loans with adjustable
interest rates and no prepayment penalties.’’ None of the CAP loans have these
features, and they are set as the reference group in both models.11
 Empirical Analysis
Propensity Score Matching
Several empirical studies suggest that borrowers take out subprime mortgages
based on their credit score, income, payment history, level of down payment, debt
ratios, and loan size limits; there is mixed evidence on the effect of demographics
(Courchane, Surette, and Zorn, 2004; Cutts and Van Order, 2005; Chomsisengphet
and Pennington-Cross, 2006; Courchane, 2007). Based on the literature review,
two key underwriting factors of FICO score and DTI are included in the analysis.
They are assumed to directly affect credit risk and therefore affect mortgage
choice/assignment, since higher credit risk is hypothesized to be associated with
a greater probability of taking out a subprime mortgage. LTV, another important
underwriting variable, is generally considered to raise endogeniety concerns. In
this case, higher LTV is one distinct characteristic of most CAP loans, with over
82% of CAP loans having an LTV equal to or higher than 97%. By contrast, most
subprime loans have an LTV of less than 90%. Courchane, Surette, and Zorn
(2004) also suggest that high LTV may be associated with higher risk but is not
necessarily associated with getting a subprime mortgage. Because the focus here
is the impact of borrower and neighborhood characteristics on borrowers’ choice
/assignment of mortgages, LTV variables are not included in the model.
In addition to the underwriting variables, loan amount is included, along with
several factors measuring local market dynamics and credit risk. A ZIP Code level
credit risk measure was constructed: the mean FICO score for mortgages
originated in the preceding year from the LPS data. The hypothesis is that
subprime lenders tend to market in neighborhoods or areas with a larger share of
potential borrowers who have impaired credit history. The ZIP Code level
educational distribution and the share of minority in the ZIP Code from the 2000
Census were included in the models. The ZIP Code educational distribution wasRisky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  259
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included as a proxy of residents’ ﬁnancial knowledge and literacy. Furthermore a
ZIP Code level HHI was constructed using HMDA data to measure the extent of
competition in the market in which borrowers’ properties are located.12 The HHI
measure also partially represents the volume of transactions in the area, since more
transactions in a hot market could, though not necessarily would, attract more
lenders to the market. In addition, quarterly calendar dummy variables were
included to account for ﬂuctuations in the yield curve that could affect market
dynamics.
Exhibit 5 presents the results from logistic regression models for different
vintages. Across different years, credit risk measures are highly predictive:
borrower FICO score, coded into buckets with above 720 as the holdout category,
is highly predictive of the use of subprime loans; coefﬁcients are relatively large
and decrease monotonically as credit score categories increase. In other words, as
expected, the higher the FICO score, the lower the probability of taking out a
subprime mortgage. Compared to those with very high DTI (42%), borrowers
with lower DTIs are generally less likely to receive subprime loans; exceptions
are the buckets with low DTI (28%) for the 2005 and 2006 samples. While it
seems CAP borrowers had very high DTIs in 2006, the results generally suggest
that borrowers with very high DTIs are more likely to receive subprime loans. In
all the models, loan amount is positive for the use of subprime loans, consistent
with the hypothesis that subprime borrowing involves higher costs, with costs
being driven by large ﬁxed components.
Further, ZIP Code level average credit score is statistically signiﬁcant and
negatively related to the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage, suggesting
that borrowers in areas with a higher share of low-score population are more likely
to receive subprime loans. ZIP Code level education performs about as expected,
with higher educational attainment roughly associated with a reduced probability
of receiving a subprime mortgage. Borrowers in areas with a higher share of
minorities are more likely to use subprime mortgages. Finally, higher HHIs are
associated with a lower probability of taking out a subprime mortgage, suggesting
that, at least in the period from 2003 to 2006, subprime loans were more likely
to be in the markets with more intensive competition and/or more transactions.
In this analysis, the logit is deﬁned rather than the predicted probability as the
propensity score, because the logit is approximately normally distributed. For the
one-to-one nearest neighbor with caliper match, the subprime loan with the closest
propensity score within a caliper was selected for the ﬁrst CAP loan after the
subprime and randomly ordered CAP loans. Both cases were then removed from
further consideration and the subprime loan was selected to match the next CAP
loan. For the one-to-many match, the subprime loans were matched with CAP
loans with the closest propensity score within a caliper after all the loans were
randomly sorted. Instead of removing the matched cases after matching, as in the
one-to-one match, the matched CAP loans were kept in the sample to ﬁnd the
matching CAP loans for the next subprime loan. This allows us to match as many










































dti28 0.172 0.088 0.006 0.941 0.616 0.000 1.324 0.000
dti 28–36 1.369 0.000 1.252 0.000 0.603 0.000 0.216 0.018
dti 36–42 1.411 0.000 1.486 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.160 0.060
dti42
cscore580 4.632 0.000 3.943 0.000 4.182 0.000 1.900 0.000
cscore 580–620 2.040 0.000 2.237 0.000 2.846 0.000 1.245 0.000
cscore 620–660 1.431 0.000 1.121 0.000 1.438 0.000 1.021 0.000
cscore 660–720 0.850 0.000 0.550 0.000 0.632 0.000 0.483 0.000
cscore  720
loan amt 0.012 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000
qtr1 0.055 0.585 0.553 0.000 0.606 0.000 1.137 0.000
qtr2 0.019 0.843 0.062 0.407 0.315 0.000 0.891 0.000
























































Exhibit 5  (continued)










HHI (in 10,000) 14.763 0.000 18.747 0.000 21.058 0.000 23.296 0.000
area credit score 0.004 0.046 0.004 0.053 0.002 0.438 0.000 0.937
pctmin 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.017 0.000 0.014 0.000
pct less high
pct high 0.124 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.144 0.000
pct somecoll 0.062 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.015 0.037
pct coll 0.082 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.092 0.000
cons 6.015 0.000 5.411 0.000 2.164 0.177 6.127 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.35
Notes: For 2003, N  7,350; for 2004, N  20,961; for 2005, N  13,954; and for 2006, N  9,021.262  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
Exhibit 6  Description of Matching Schemes and Resample Sizes




N of the New
Sample
CAP Subprime
Match 1 Nearest 1-to-1 using caliper  0.1 9,221 5,558 5,558
Match 2 Nearest 1-to-1 using caliper  0.25 9,221 6,349 6,349
Match 3 Nearest 1-to-many using caliper  0.1 9,221 3,943 35,971
Match 4 Nearest 1-to-many using caliper  0.25 9,221 3,944 36,236
Notes: For the one-to-one nearest neighbor with caliper match, the subprime loan with the closest
propensity score within a caliper for the ﬁrst CAP loan was selected after the sample was
randomly ordered. Both cases were removed from further consideration. The subprime loan was
selected to match the next CAP loan. For the one-to-many match, subprime loans were matched
with CAP loans with the closest propensity score within a caliper after all the loans were randomly
sorted. Instead of removing the matched cases after matching as in the one-to-one match, the
matched CAP loans were kept in the sample and matched to the matching CAP loan for the next
subprime loan.
0.25 times of standard error were evaluated, as suggested by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1985). In other words, two matching algorithms were employed, which
allowed matching one CAP loan with one or multiple subprime loans, and two
caliper sizes, allowed evaluation of the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to varying sizes.
For the one-to-many matched sample, to ensure that the analysis was
representative of the matched set, we applied a system of weights, where the
weight was the inverse of the number of subprime loans that matched to one
single CAP loan.
Exhibit 6 describes the four matching schemes and numbers of loans for the
resamples: Match 1 and Match 2 are based on the one-to-one match; Match 3 and
Match 4 are based on the one-to-many match. Match 1 and Match 3 use nearest
neighbor matching within a more restrictive caliper of 0.1, while other matching
schemes employ a wider caliper (0.25 times of the standard deviation of the
propensity scores). The results show that the more restrictive caliper does not
dramatically reduce the sample size; about 791 cases (12%) were lost from Match
2 to Match 1 and only one CAP loan from Match 4 to Match 3. Because the
qualitative results do not change and a restrictive caliper can lower the likelihood
of producing inexact matching, the schemes using the more restrictive caliper size
of 0.1 (Matches 1 and 3) were the focus of the analysis of loan performance. For
the one-to-one match (Match 1), the sample included 5,558 CAP loans and 5,558
matching subprime loans. For the one-to-many match, the sample was 35,971
subprime loans matched to 3,943 CAP loans (Match 3).Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  263
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Covariate distributions were checked after matching. Both Match 1 and Match 3
removed all signiﬁcant differences, except LTV variables, between groups. For
the matched groups, as Exhibit 7 shows, borrowers are remarkably similar across
all groups except for LTV ratios, and there was a reduced but more balanced
sample of CAP and subprime borrowers. Compared to CAP loans, which are
usually ﬁxed-rate retail loans with no prepayment penalty, subprime loans have
distinctive features and terms. A vast majority (86%) of subprime loans are
adjustable rate mortgages; most (70%) were obtained through brokers; and many
(41%) have prepayment penalties.
Performance of the Matched Sample
The performance of CAP loans and subprime loans with similar characteristics is
examined next using a very rich panel dataset (loan-months). For the matched
sample, the payment history during the period from loan origination to March
2008 is evaluated. During this period, CAP loans had a lower serious delinquency
rate: only 9.0% had ever experienced 90-day delinquencies before March 2008,
compared to 19.8% of comparable subprime loans (Exhibit 8). Subprime loans
also had a higher prepayment rate: 38% compared to about 18% for the matched
CAP loans.
In addition to the subprime variables, the MNL model included important
underwriting variables, including borrower DTI ratio, credit history, loan age, and
loan amount, as well as the put option. According to the option-based theory,
home equity plays a central role in determining the probability of foreclosure
(Deng, Quigley, and Van Order, 2000). The value of the put option is proxied by
the ratio of negative equity to the estimated property value.13 Relying on the
unpaid balance of the ﬁrst-liens in the calculation of the put option likely
overestimates the risk of subprime loans since, as suggested in Zelman, McGill,
Speer, and Ratner (2007), some subprime loans may have second mortgages that
were not captured here. A separate model was run that assumed all subprime loans
with LTVs in the 75%–95% range have a combined LTV of 95% at origination.
The ﬁndings reveal that the estimated cumulative default rates of subprime loans
are still signiﬁcantly higher than that of CAP loans but the magnitude becomes
smaller.14
Falling interest rates may lead to faster prepayments and drive down delinquency
rates as borrowers reﬁnance their way out of potential problems. To capture the
change in interest rate environment, the difference between the prevailing interest
rates was employed, which is proxied by the average interest rate of 30-year
ﬁxed-rate mortgages from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey
(PMMS), and the prevailing interest rates at the time of loan origination.
Consistent with prior work, the matched sample was further separated into two
cohorts based on years of origination. Subprime loans that originated in 2003 and
2004 were underwritten during a time of historically low interest rates and a strong264  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe







DTI28% 0.229 0.221 0.223 0.218
DTI 28%–36% 0.261 0.249 0.242 0.233
DTI 36%–42% 0.375 0.391 0.397 0.403
DTI42% 0.135 0.139 0.138 0.146
FICO Score
580 0.047 0.049 0.165 0.164
580–620 0.150 0.155 0.251 0.241
620–660 0.256 0.241 0.296 0.292
660–720 0.305 0.305 0.165 0.164
 720 0.242 0.250 0.123 0.139
LTV (* for Match 1)
80% 0.042 0.314 0.044 0.305
80%–90% 0.062 0.276 0.066 0.282
90%–97% 0.110 0.209 0.117 0.208
 97% 0.786 0.201 0.773 0.204
Loan Characteristics
loan amt* 109.4 109.7 112.0 113.2
ARMs* 0.864 0.880
Broker* 0.696 0.682
Prepayment penalty* 0.413 0.422
Note Rate* 0.066 0.078 0.066 0.078
N 5,558 5,558 3,943 35,971**
Note:
*Bivariate 2 test or t-test signiﬁcant at 0.01 level.
**Statistics based on Match 3 are weighted average and the weight is the inverse of number of
subprime loans that matched to one CAP loan.
economy, leading to a relatively good performance with very low default rates
(Cutts and Merrill, 2008). Many borrowers were able to reﬁnance their mortgages
or sell their houses because of lax underwriting and high house price appreciation
before 2007, which extinguished the default option. Instead, subprime loans that
originated in 2005 and 2006, especially subprime ARMs, have not performed as
well. These two cohorts capture some unobservable heterogeneity characterizing
mortgages that originated in a booming housing market and those that originated
in a softening housing market.
The results from the MNL regressions based on different matching samples are
listed in Exhibit 9 (one-to-one match) and Exhibit 10 (one-to-many match). ModelRisky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  265
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Exhibit 8  Performance Measures of the New Samples













CAP 8.98 18.46 7.64 25.73 10.94 7.84
Subprime 19.81 38.27 12.97 50.06 29.81 21.04
N 11,116 6,600 4,516
Note: Observation period is from origination to March 2008; if a loan was 90-day delinquent
and then prepaid, it is considered as a 90-day delinquency only.
1 considers the subprime dummy variable only, while Model 2 helps explain the
difference in performance between CAP and subprime loans. The results based
on samples using varying algorithms are quite consistent, so Exhibit 10 only lists
results for the subprime variables. It is not easy to interpret the results based on
the coefﬁcients from the MNL regressions directly. The cumulative default and
prepayment rates were estimated for the ﬁrst 24 months after origination for
borrowers with impaired credit score (FICO score 580–620) and with mean value
of other regressors, except loan age and loan characteristics, based on the MNL
regression results.
Summary of Findings
First, there is consistent evidence that subprime loans have a higher default risk
and a higher prepayment probability than CAP loans (Exhibit 11). The estimated
cumulative default rate for a 2004 subprime loan is 16.8%, about four times that
of CAP loans (4.2%). For a 2006 subprime loan, the cumulative default rate is
47.5%, about 3.3 times that of comparable CAP loans (14.3%). In other words,
CAP loans were about 70% less likely to default than a comparable subprime
loan across different vintages. The default rate of the 2005–2006 cohort is
signiﬁcantly higher than that of the 2003–2004 cohort for loans with same loan
features. Very likely this is because of changes in the underwriting standard and
in economic conditions, as well as other unobservable heterogeneity.
Subprime loans with adjustable rates are found to have a signiﬁcantly higher
default rate than comparable CAP loans. And when the adjustable rate term is
combined with the prepayment-penalty feature, the default risk of subprime loans
becomes even higher. For a 2004 sub arm loan (retail-originated subprime ARM
without prepayment penalty), the estimated cumulative default rate is 6.6%,
































Exhibit 9  MNL Regression Results of Default and Prepayment (Match 1 in Exhibit 6)
2003–2004 Sample 2005–2006 Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z
Default put 0.041 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.052 0.000
dti 28–36 0.580 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.086 0.517 0.096 0.467
dti 36–42 0.631 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.032 0.807 0.024 0.853
dti42 0.323 0.029 0.519 0.000 0.238 0.068 0.019 0.884
cscore 580 2.410 0.000 2.195 0.000 1.688 0.000 1.481 0.000
cscore 580–620 1.989 0.000 1.791 0.000 1.283 0.000 1.061 0.000
cscore 620–660 1.468 0.000 1.286 0.000 1.036 0.000 0.909 0.000
cscore 660–720 0.633 0.000 0.513 0.001 0.452 0.004 0.390 0.010
unpaid balance (in log) 0.353 0.000 0.261 0.009 0.168 0.071 0.069 0.461
loan age (in log mon) 0.937 0.000 1.006 0.000 1.005 0.000 1.056 0.000
area credit score 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.010 0.000
rate difference 0.105 0.286 0.108 0.272 0.044 0.672 0.058 0.576
area unemp rate 0.047 0.091 0.049 0.077 0.040 0.169 0.020 0.484
y2003 (y2005) 0.038 0.676 0.108 0.242 0.603 0.000 0.496 0.000
subprime 1.589 0.000 1.604 0.000
sub arm 0.541 0.003 0.363 0.032
sub arm&ppp 1.530 0.029 1.906 0.000
sub bro 1.944 0.000 1.450 0.000
sub bro&ppp 1.983 0.000 1.528 0.000
sub bro&arm 1.652 0.000 1.906 0.000
sub bro&arm&ppp 1.985 0.000 1.827 0.000























































Exhibit 9  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of Default and Prepayment (Match 1 in Exhibit 6)
2003–2004 Sample 2005–2006 Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z
Prepay put 0.015 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.007 0.064 0.006 0.186
dti 28–36 0.290 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.045 0.761 0.016 0.916
dti 36–42 0.350 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.059 0.682 0.149 0.312
dti42 0.014 0.836 0.118 0.091 0.301 0.029 0.174 0.249
cscore580 0.145 0.311 0.006 0.969 0.087 0.673 0.010 0.963
cscore 580–620 0.083 0.309 0.003 0.972 0.239 0.065 0.276 0.044
cscore 620–660 0.331 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.192 0.132 0.139 0.287
cscore 660–720 0.153 0.004 0.143 0.007 0.076 0.523 0.115 0.343
unpaid balance (in log) 0.329 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.055 0.537 0.116 0.205
loan age (in log mon) 0.451 0.000 0.504 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.693 0.000
area credit score 0.001 0.388 0.002 0.094 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.001
rate difference 0.161 0.003 0.150 0.005 0.053 0.669 0.067 0.594
area unemp rate 0.014 0.399 0.020 0.220 0.031 0.379 0.033 0.354
y2003 (y2005) 0.014 0.757 0.037 0.414 0.253 0.037 0.283 0.027
subprime 0.922 0.000 1.239 0.000
sub arm 0.612 0.000 1.130 0.000
sub arm&ppp 1.685 0.000 2.293 0.000
sub bro 0.433 0.000 1.205 0.001
sub bro&ppp 0.978 0.000 0.240 0.513
sub bro&arm 1.083 0.000 1.663 0.000
sub bro&arm&ppp 1.334 0.000 0.949 0.000
































Exhibit 9  (continued)
MNL Regression Results of Default and Prepayment (Match 1 in Exhibit 6)
Note: sub arm represents subprime retail originated ARMs without prepayment penalty; sub arm&ppp represents subprime retail originated ARMs with
prepayment penalties; sub bro represents subprime broker originated ﬁxed-rate mortgages without prepayment penalties; sub bro&ppp represents subprime
broker originated ﬁxed-rate mortgages with prepayment penalties; sub bro&arm represents subprime broker originated ARMs without prepayment penalties;
sub bro&arm&ppp represents subprime broker originated ARMs with prepayment penalties. In the 2003–2004 sample, N  192,179 of 6,600 loans Log























































Exhibit 10  MNL Regression Results of Default and Prepayment (Match 3 in Exhibit 6)
2003–2004 Sample 2005–2006 Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z Coeff. P  z
Default subprime 1.443 0.000 1.592 0.000
sub arm 0.480 0.003 0.304 0.006
sub arm&ppp 1.643 0.000 2.244 0.000
sub bro 1.713 0.000 1.620 0.000
sub bro&ppp 1.775 0.000 1.773 0.000
sub bro&arm 1.627 0.000 1.728 0.000
sub bro&arm&ppp 1.843 0.000 1.951 0.000
Prepay subprime 0.941 0.000 1.018 0.000
sub arm 0.668 0.000 0.769 0.000
sub arm&ppp 1.537 0.000 1.729 0.000
sub bro 0.513 0.000 0.616 0.000
sub bro&ppp 0.897 0.000 0.608 0.000
sub bro&arm 1.055 0.000 1.186 0.000
sub bro&arm&ppp 1.380 0.000 1.234 0.000
Note: see note in Exhibit 9 for the deﬁnition of different loan products. There should be 8 dummies for different combinations of loan features but the sample
sizes of the buckets of retail-originated ﬁxed-rate subprime with and without prepayments are too small, which does not allow us conduct meaningful
analysis. In the 2003–2004 sample, N  341,367 of 16,604 loans; log likelihood  47,494.0 in Model 1 and 47,212.4 in Model 2. In the 2005–
































Exhibit 11  Estimated Cumulative Default and Prepayment Rate
(24 months after origination for a borrower with impaired credit score of 580–620)






CAP 4.17% 11.58% 14.30% 7.58%
Subprime 16.80% 25.00% 4.0 47.47% 18.82% 3.3
sub arm 6.59% 18.14% 1.6 16.82% 21.54% 1.2
sub arm&ppp 13.34% 42.51% 3.2 42.46% 42.03% 3.0
sub bro 24.33% 14.10% 5.8 40.57% 19.69% 2.8
sub bro&ppp 23.46% 22.93% 5.6 47.87% 4.99% 3.3
sub bro&arm 17.27% 25.95% 4.1 50.71% 25.85% 3.5
sub bro&arm&ppp 21.93% 30.99% 5.3 53.87% 14.17% 3.8
Note: see note in Exhibit 9 for the deﬁnition of different loan products. The predicted cumulative default and prepayment rate is as of 24 months after
origination for a borrower with a FICO score between 580–620 and holding a mortgage originated in 2004 or 2006, with the mean value of other
regressors. The estimation is based on regression results in Exhibit 9.Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  271
JRER  Vol. 33  N o . 2–2 0 1 1
mortgage has a prepayment penalty, the estimated default rate increases to 13.3%
for a 2004 sub arm&ppp loan (retail-originated adjustable-rate subprime loan
with prepayment penalty), over 100% relatively higher than that of sub arm.
Finally, the broker-origination channel is signiﬁcantly associated with an increased
level of default. For example, the estimated cumulative default rate for a 2004
sub bro&arm loan (broker-originated adjustable-rate subprime loan without
prepayment penalty) is 17.3%, signiﬁcantly higher than the 6.5% of the sub arm
loans. For a 2006 sub bro&arm loan, the estimated cumulative default rate is as
high as 50.7%, much higher than the 16.8% of the sub arm loans. The same
pattern can also be identiﬁed for adjustable-rate subprime loans with prepayment
penalties. When a broker-originated subprime ARM has the term of prepayment
penalty, the default risk for 2004 originations is 5.3 times as high as that of CAP
loans (21.9% vs. 4.2%) and for 2006 originations 3.8 times as high (53.9% vs.
14.3%).
Overall, the results suggest that, all other observed characteristics being equal,
borrowers receiving subprime loans are about three to ﬁve times more likely to
default, depending on the mortgage origination year and the combined LTV.
Especially, borrowers are about three to over ﬁve times more likely to default if
they obtained their mortgages through brokers. When this feature is combined
with the adjustable rate and/or prepayment penalty, the default risk is even higher.
One possible explanation is that, as suggested in Woodward (2008) and LaCour-
Little (2009), loans originated through brokers have signiﬁcantly higher closing
costs and prices, which increases borrowers’ costs and can lead to elevated default
risk. It is also possible that borrowers obtaining loans through brokers are more
likely to receive products with features that may increase the default risk. Finally,
it is very likely that the broker-originated loans have looser underwriting standards
that have not been fully captured by the model. All these contentions are consistent
with the results, and additional research is needed to examine this issue in more
detail.
As to the outcome of prepayment, there are two obvious trends. The ﬁrst is that
subprime loans, especially subprime ARMs, have a signiﬁcantly higher
prepayment rate than CAP loans (Exhibit 11). Second, for recent originations
(2005–2006), subprime loans with prepayment penalties are less likely to prepay
than loans with similar terms but without prepayment penalties. But for early
originations (2003–2004), the pattern is reversed: subprime loans with prepayment
penalties have a higher prepayment rate, probably because they are more likely
to be prepaid after the prepayment penalty period has expired. Although the
prepayment penalty clauses for all subprime loans could not be determined
because of missing values, for those loans with complete information, prepayment
penalties were most frequently levied within the ﬁrst two to three years of loan
origination. As of March 2008, then, most prepayment penalties for 2003–2004
originations had expired. But prepayment may also be part of the problem if the
borrower prepaid the loans by reﬁnancing into another subprime product.272  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
Empirical Results of Other Controls
Because the results for most of the variables are generally consistent across
different models, discussion of other control variables is based primarily on Model
1, as summarized in Exhibit 9. For other controlled variables, the results suggest:
 Put Option: Borrowers with less or negative equity in their homes (larger
value of put) are more likely to default and less likely to prepay. The
results conﬁrm the common wisdom that the level of equity in a home
is a strong predictor for prepayment and default.
 Credit History: As expected, there is consistent evidence that borrowers
with lower credit scores are more likely to experience serious
delinquency.15
 Debt-to-Income Ratio: Higher debt-to-income ratios are associated with
a higher default risk for the 2003–2004 cohort, but the coefﬁcients are
insigniﬁcant for the 2005–2006 sample.
Loan Characteristics:
 Size of Unpaid Balance: Larger loan size is generally associated with
lower default risk. Larger loan size is also associated with higher
prepayment probability for the 2003–2004 cohort.
Area and Neighborhood Controls:
 Area Credit Risk: Average credit score in the ZIP Code is signiﬁcantly
and negatively associated with default risk. There is also some evidence
that ZIP Code average credit score is positively associated with
prepayment probability (for the 2005–2006 vintage).
 Interest Rate Dynamics: For different cohorts, the impact of interest
rate environment is different. For the 2003–2004 cohort, a larger
difference between the prevailing interest rate and the average rate at
loan origination increases the prepayment probability but for the recent
cohort, the increase in average interest rate had no signiﬁcant impact on
both the prepayment and default probability.
 County Unemployment Rate: Average county unemployment rate is
generally insigniﬁcant in explaining the default and prepayment
behaviors across different models possibly because the study period ends
in early 2008 when the economy-wide crisis was in its early stages.
Time Dummies:
 Dummies of 2003 and 2005 Originations: The 2005 originations are
signiﬁcantly less likely to default, compared to the 2006 cohort.Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  273
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 Conclusion
As the current economic crisis continues, the debate persists as to what caused
the initial foreclosure crisis in the mortgage markets and what we should do in
the future. The ﬁndings reveal that, for comparable borrowers, the estimated
default risk is much lower with a CRA-type CAP loan than with a subprime
mortgage. More narrowly, the broker-origination channel, an adjustable rate, and
a prepayment penalty, all contribute substantially to the elevated risk of default
among subprime loans. In the worst scenario, when broker origination is combined
with the features of adjustable rate and prepayment penalty, the default risk of a
borrower is about three to ﬁve times as high as that of a comparable borrower
holding a CRA-type product. The results clearly suggest that the relative higher
default risk of subprime loans may not be solely attributed to borrower credit risk;
instead, it is signiﬁcantly associated with the characteristics of the products and
the origination channel in the subprime market. Thus, the results suggest that when
done right and responsibly, lending to LMI borrowers is a viable proposition.
Responsible borrowers and CRA lending should not be blamed for the current
housing crisis.
While the results are interesting for understanding the performance difference
between subprime and CRA loans, CAP has some program-speciﬁc characteristics.
Though national in scope, CAP is geographically concentrated in certain markets.
In addition, this analysis focuses solely on home purchase lending activities and
borrowers with full or alternative documentation only. In addition, the variables
available to researchers and investors are not the same as the loan ofﬁcer and may
not include all the measures that determine participation in CAP, subprime, or
prime lending market. As such, it is unclear whether or not the ﬁndings for the
CAP program are applicable to a national population of CRA loans and the entire
subprime market. However, CAP borrowers are matched with subprime borrowers
with similar risk proﬁles, focusing in this way on the less risky portion of the
subprime market. Investor loans and low- or no-doc subprime mortgages have
been excluded from the analyses, all of which are generally associated with a
higher credit risk. Further, if borrowers are indeed steered to low- and no-doc
loans in the subprime market even when they could have documented their
income, as has been asserted by some observers, this would suggest that the
increased risk of having one’s mortgage originate in the subprime market is even
greater than captured in this paper. As such, this research provides more
convincing evidence of the relative risk of the CRA-type loans and the impact of
loan features and origination channels on loan performance.
 Endnotes
1 For more complete details of CRA regulations, see http://www.fﬁec.gov/cra/
default.html.
2 The CRA assessment area for a retail-oriented banking institution must include ‘‘the
areas in which the institution operates branches and deposit-taking automated teller274  Ding, Quercia, Li, and Ratcliffe
machines and any surrounding areas in which it originated or purchased a substantial
portion of its loans,’’ (Avery, Bostic, and Canner, 2000, p. 712).
3 Examples of guidelines that reduced cash required to close include: lesser of $500 or
1% from borrower’s own funds; maximum LTV of 98% and maximum combined LTV
(including soft seconds) of 103%; no reserves required. Examples of guideline ﬂexibility
with respect to credit history include: demonstrate six-month satisfactory payment
history with four sources of credit, either traditional or non-traditional; FICO scores
thresholds below 620 accepted in certain programs. Examples of underwriting ﬂexibility
in assessing the ability to repay include: maximum total ratio of debt payments to income
ratio of 43%, or up to 45% if new housing payment is not more than 25% higher than
prior housing payment.
4 Examples of offsetting or combined guideline ﬂexibilities include: maximum total ratio
of debt payments to income varies from 38% to 48% with borrowers with higher credit
scores allowed higher ratios; higher downpayments or reserve requirements for
borrowers with FICO below 620.
5 To qualify for the CAP program, borrowers must meet one of three criteria: (1) have
income under 80% of the area median income (AMI) for the metropolitan area; (2) be
a minority with income below 115% of AMI; (3) or purchase a home in a high-minority
(30%) or low-income (80% AMI) census tract and have an income below 115%
AMI.
6 The secondary market usually classiﬁes mortgages into different levels or loan grades,
such as Premier Plus, Premier, A-, B, C, and C- based on borrower’s risk proﬁle and
loan features (Chomsisengphet and Penning-Cross, 2006). Prime loans (or Premier Plus,
Premier) are usually classiﬁed as A. Loans rated by the secondary market as B, C, and
other categories below C are usually classiﬁed as subprime and they are sometimes
referred as B&C loans. If a mortgage risk categorization that falls between prime and
sub-prime, but is closer to prime, it is referred to as ‘‘A-’’ or ‘‘A minus.’’
7 The number of seasoned loans was checked and their impact on the performance of
mortgages was evaluated. For the 2005–2006 cohort, the number of seasoned loans
(entered the datasets six months after origination) were quite few for both LPS loans
and CAP loans (less than 7%). There were some seasoned loans for the 2003–2004
cohorts but the shares were quite similar for subprime loans (40%) and CAP loans
(41%).
8 Other common matching algorithms include: nearest-neighbor matching, kernel
matching, local linear matching, Mahalanobis metric matching, Mahalanobis metric
matching including the propensity score, and difference in differences methods (see
review in Guo, Barth, and Gibbons, 2006).
9 This assumption is also known as the exogeneity, unconfoundedness, ignorable treatment
assignment, conditional homogeneity, or the selection on observables assumption (Guo,
Barth, and Gibbons, 2006).
10 Unfortunately, there are too few loans in the matched sample for retail-originated ﬁxed-
rate mortgages (less than 20 loans for the one-to-one match for each category), which
does not allow a meaningful analysis, so they were dropped from further analysis.
11 Of course, including adjustable-rate mortgages and ﬁxed-rate mortgages in a single
performance equation may be questionable since there are huge differences on how these
types of loans perform over time and react to contemporaneous economic conditions
(Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2010). However, one of the research questions of this studyRisky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages  275
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is to identify whether an adjustable-rate term has increased default risk for borrowers
with similar characteristics. A model focusing on the ﬁxed rate market only was run
and the results are quite consistent with the model employed in this paper (the
coefﬁcients of the subprime variables are even greater).
12 The HHI is constructed as the sum of squared market shares of ﬁrms in a ZIP Code.
Based on HMDA data, the market share of ﬁrms were identiﬁed in a census tract and
then matched to corresponding ZIP Codes. When a census tract overlaps multiple ZIP
Codes, it was assumed that the share of loans for the particular ﬁrm is the same as the
share of other house units in the tract. As such, the index ranges from 10,000 in the
case of 100% market concentration to near zero in the case of many ﬁrms with equally
small market shares.
13 The value of the put option is proxied by the ratio of negative equity (unpaid mortgage
balance minus estimated house price based on the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) house price index) to the estimated house price. The MSA FHFA HPI based
on the house price index was used primarily. When the property is located in an area
outside MSAs, the state level HPI is used.
14 About two-thirds (63%) of subprime loans had a LTV of 75% to 95% in this sample.
When it was assumed that all these subprime loans took out second or higher liens, the
estimated cumulative default rates of subprime loans was still signiﬁcantly higher than
that of CAP loans but the magnitude becomes smaller: the relative default risk of
subprime loans becomes 2.6 times for 2004 originations to 2.8 times for 2006
originations, relative to that of comparable CAP loans. Of course, this treatment
underestimates the default risk of subprime loans because not all subprime loans within
that range had higher liens, while an unknown portion of CAP loans had second liens
but were not considered.
15 There may be an interaction effect between risky loan characteristics and risky
borrowers. In fact, risky loan characteristics are found to have an even bigger negative
impact for a ‘‘low-risk’’ (high credit score) borrower. One possible explanation is that
that risky loan terms play a more important role for ‘‘low-risk’’ borrowers (the increase
in their default rate is relatively higher when they receive products with risky terms)
than borrowers with lower credit scores. Of course, further studies are needed to draw
more concrete conclusions.
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